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Abstract: This study investigates the efficacy of foreign policy thrust and instruments in attaining 
hegemonic status, especially by rival states within a region/continent. Predicated on this, the paper 
zeroes-in on the relationship between Nigeria and South Africa, identifying their interaction as 
delicate oscillation between cooperation and competition, with the 2014 Arms Deal debacle marking 
a watershed. As a qualitative study that relied on secondary data, the adoption of realist theory as 
framework backed by textual analysis informed the findings, discussions and recommendations of the 
paper. An appropriately articulated and executed foreign policy thrust by Nigeria to capture national 
interests will boost the country’s chances of levelling up with South Africa in the fierce competition 
for regional hegemony. 
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1. Introduction 
As states continue to coexist with one another in the international system, they do 
so within the context of competition and cooperation in the exploitation as well as 
distribution of resources. (Oni & Taiwo, 2016) It is in line with this custom that 
states, globally, engage with one another. Where exploitation and distribution of 
resources exist, competition for the control of these resources abound. This 
competition can manifest at global, regional, sub-regional and domestic levels. In 
the quest for relevance within the African continent, several African countries have 
                                                          
1 Covenant University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ota-Nigeria, 
Address: KM. 10 Idiroko Road, Canaan Land, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria, E-mail: 
eseujara@gmail.com. 
2 PhD, Covenant University, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Ota-
Nigeria, Address: KM. 10 Idiroko Road, Canaan Land, Ota, Ogun State, Nigeria, Corresponding 
author: olajide.ibietan@covenantuniversity.edu.ng. 
 
AUDRI, Vol. 10, no 2/2017, pp. 122-142 
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
123 
 
attempted to attain significant status within the region; Nigeria and South Africa 
inclusive. As Seteolu and Okuneye (2017) highlight, Nigeria and South Africa are 
the two largest economies in the African region; both are viewed as harbingers of 
development in the continent and Hegemons within their sub-regions. Over the 
years, Nigeria and South Africa have collaborated to situate the region as a critical 
global actor in international political and economic relations. 
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has assumed several roles in Africa, some of 
which are regional leader, regional power, liberator, to mention but a few, across 
the different administrations in Nigeria. (Folarin, 2010) In the West-African sub-
region, it can be stated that Nigeria is the dominant leader both politically and 
economically as a result of her resource endowments and geography. (Oni & 
Taiwo, 2016) These roles have influenced Nigeria’s foreign policy thrust, which 
centred on making Africa the centre piece. As a result of Nigeria’s status in the 
region, the regional responsibilities and commitments that the country has assumed 
are rather huge, in view of the size of the countries bordering it, and the capacity of 
their economies in comparison to Nigeria’s. (Adeyemi-Suenu & Inokoba, 2010) 
These obligations derived from the Afrocentric foreign policy posture that the 
country has adopted which required her to expend large amount of resources in 
addressing issues on the African continent in order to attain and sustain the role of 
regional hegemon in Africa.  
South Africa came to the fore in the quest for regional power within Africa with its 
freedom from the strongholds of apartheid in 1994. South Africa’s celebrated entry 
into the African democratic environment has brought about changes in the power 
structure of the African leadership space. (Ogunnubi & Isike, 2015) Prior to South 
Africa’s entry as a democracy in the region, Nigeria was the dominant regional 
leader, but since 1994, South Africa has contended with Nigeria for regional 
superiority and relevance in different dimensions. This competition for superiority, 
arising from their foreign policy objectives, manifests in several forms. It finds 
expression in their contest for leadership of the African Union; Nigeria’s quest to 
become a member of the G20 (Group of 20) which South Africa belongs to; the 
quest for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council; competition for 
economic hegemony in Africa; Nigeria’s pursuit of inclusion in special multilateral 
institutions like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), IBSA (India, 
Brazil and South Africa). (Molele, 2012) These are some of the few manifestations 
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of the contest for regional hegemony between both countries on bilateral and 
multilateral levels. 
Some scholars argue that Africa’s hegemonic power claim tilts in favour of South 
Africa. Obi in (Ogunnubi & Amao, 2016, p. 299) posits that this is based on the 
fact that South Africa is “projecting Africa’s voice and interests a global economic 
forums and groups, and in its effectiveness as Africa’s sole player in the BRICS 
and G20.” The argument is that South Africa has taken strategic steps that has 
earned her recognition on a global scale in comparison to Nigeria which has been 
playing in the league of democratic and independent nation-states much longer 
than South Africa. A contrary argument is that Nigeria qualifies as the regional 
power owing to the huge population, superior power capabilities based on its 
possession of hard and soft power in the region and acceptance of its leadership by 
majority of the states within the region. (Ogunnubi & Okeke-Uzodike, 2016) This 
position however may only be acceptable at surface level owing to the domestic 
challenges, leadership ineptitude and policy discontinuities that have hampered 
qualitative representation of the true capabilities of Nigeria’s power potentials at 
regional and global levels.  
This study presents the arms deal debacle of 2014 between Nigeria and South 
Africa as a flashpoint which marks a watershed in Nigeria-South Africa relations. 
Highighting this event is crucial to this study due to the nature of relationship 
existing between both countries, being a mixture of cooperation and competition. 
(Seteolu & Okuneye, 2017) The paper seeks to analyse how Nigeria’s foreign 
policy can be strategically articulated and executed to attain regional hegemonic 
status based on the fallout between Nigeria and South Africa over the arms deal in 
2014.  
The questions posed by this study are: In the battle for supremacy between both 
countries, what is the effect of the arms deal debacle on the quest for hegemony? 
Can Nigeria’s foreign policy posture be improved to realise its hegemonic 
aspiration? What are the challenges to and prospects of Nigeria’s foreign policy as 
a tool for achieving regional hegemony in Africa?.  
1.1. Method, Main Argument and Structure of the Paper 
The discourse and interrogation of issues in this paper utilised qualitative method 
of study backed by textual analysis. Data was collected mainly via secondary 
sources such as books, journals, newspapers and internet sources. The Realist 
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theory as framework for discussion sets the basis for the analysis of foreign policy 
as an instrument of attaining regional hegemonic status in view of the realities of 
the power struggles among rival states. The theory is also underscored by Neo-
Gramscian tenets in order to deploy a blend of theories that can aid the formation 
of strategic foreign policy to attain and sustain hegemonic status in a contemporary 
international system. The paper, thus advances the argument that a properly 
articulated and implemented foreign policy is crucial to attaining regional 
hegemonic status. It also argues that domestic challenges have circumscribed 
Nigeria’s efforts in achieving the full potentials of her foreign policy thrusts. This 
assertion is made in the context of the inherent quest for hegemony within the 
African region, especially between South Africa and Nigeria. The paper is divided 
into the following sections: Section One introduces the study. The second section 
clarifies the key concepts in the paper – foreign policy, regional power, and 
hegemony. Section three presents the theoretical framework and its application to 
the study, while section four analyses Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign policy 
objectives as it relates to the quest for hegemony, and identifies some flashpoints in 
their bilateral relations. Section five discusses the Nigeria-South Africa arms deal 
debacle and its impact on the quest for regional hegemony in Africa. It also 
analyses the challenges to Nigeria’s foreign policy and explains why Nigeria seems 
to be behind South Africa in terms of regional and global relevance. The paper is 
concluded in section six with suggestions for attaining Nigeria’s foreign policy 
drive in the quest for regional hegemony.  
 
2. Conceptual Clarification 
The concepts of foreign policy, regional power and hegemony are explained in this 
section. 
2.1. The Concept of Foreign Policy 
For a country to relate effectively with another, its foreign policy must be properly 
articulated, defined and strategically executed. The concept of foreign policy is 
crucial to the study of international relations. In analyzing how foreign policy is 
linked to regional hegemonic aspirations, one must first give clarity to the concept 
as it pertains to this study.  
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Ade-Ibijola (2013) sums up foreign policy as the intentions of the state that has 
been declared. While this definition may have captured an aspect of foreign policy, 
it is not complete. This is largely so because states may not always declare their 
intentions before they engage in actions externally. Also, the definition does not 
clarify the target of the declared intentions. Thus, it would have been apt to explain 
foreign policy as a representation of the state’s attitude towards the international 
environment (Ajayi, Njoaguani, Olorunyomi, & Folarin, 2015). 
Foreign policy can also be seen as an offshoot of public policy aimed at achieving 
aspects of the domestic policy that cannot be fully actualized without having 
interactions with other countries of the world (Ukwuije, 2015). This definition 
weaves the domestic and international environment together with the thread of 
policy, thus making the three factors indispensable in the foreign policy discourse. 
Rosenau’s (1974) conception of foreign policy transcends the projection of state 
interests based on domestic policy. He identifies it as the authoritative actions 
which governments take or are committed to take, in order to preserve the desirable 
aspects of the international environment or alter its undesirable aspects. 
Legg and Morrison in (Nwosu, 1994, p. 106) conceive foreign policy as “a set of 
explicit or implicit objectives of a given social unit or set of strategies and tactics 
designed to achieve the objective...” They proceeded to assert that foreign policy 
also addresses “the perception of a need to influence the behaviour of other states 
or of international organisations...” The goal of foreign policy would therefore be 
to “...either maintain the existing pattern of behaviour or change the present pattern 
of initiating a new set of policies or by attaining or halting the implementation of 
existing ones.” In other words, though foreign policies may be implicitly or 
explicitly stated, they should achieve the aim of influencing, initiating or changing 
policy in such a way that it favours the country. 
Ola (2017) sees foreign policy as the range of government actions in its relations 
with other bodies similarly acting on the stage in order to advance the nation’s 
interest. This definition infers that foreign policy should target non-state actors as 
well as state actors due to the increasing relevance of non-state actors in 
international affairs. Foreign policy can thus be captured as the actions and attitude 
of the state based on its internal environment to the external sphere with the goal of 
protecting national interests and achieving international relevance. 
2.2. The Concept of Hegemony 
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Hegemony has been used interchangeably with dominance, leadership, power and a 
few other concepts. This informed the need for scholars to attempt an articulation 
of what hegemony really entails. The term “hegemony” originated from the Greek 
word “hegemonia” which refers to the dominant and oppressive status of one 
element in the system over the others. (Yilmaz, 2010, p. 194) 
Mansfield in (Ogunnubi, 2013, p. 30) defined hegemony as “the holding by one 
state of a preponderance of power in the international system or a regional 
subsystem, so that it can single-handedly dominate the rules and arrangement by 
which international and regional political and economic relations are conducted.” 
This definition still projects the domination factor as a means to exert influence. 
This view is similar to Nye’s (1990) who identified a hegemonic state as one that is 
able to dictate or at least dominate the rules and arrangement by which 
international politics and economics are conducted. 
Talibu & Ahmad (2016, p. 16) argue in accordance with Nigerian foreign policy 
vocabulary that hegemony denotes “benign leadership and shouldering of 
continental responsibilities.” Warner (2016, p. 5) however underscores the concept 
of “illusory hegemony” which occurs when a “state aspirant of regional or sub-
regional hegemony possesses some, but not all, of the empirical qualities typical of 
a hegemon: namely, the realist attributes of a hegemon without the attendant liberal 
credentials.” By realist attributes of hegemony, he refers to military, economic, and 
population dominance; while the liberal credentials refer to legitimacy and popular 
acceptance of rule. (Warner, 2016, pp. 8-9) Following these conceptualizations, 
this paper is tempted to posit that both Nigeria and South Africa are on the path to 
regional hegemony, but have not fully attained it. What currently exists may 
however be likened to Warner’s (2016) conception of illusory hegemony. 
2.3. The Concept of Regional Power 
There is no consensus of opinion among scholars on the meaning of regional 
power. Nolte (2010) posits that the difficulty in classifying a state as a regional 
power lies in the fact that such status is not solely dependent on power resources, 
but also with global and regional power hierarchy configurations. Scholars have 
attempted to present criteria that can be useful in identifying states that can be 
accepted as regional powers based on the submissions below:  
Osterud (1992, p. 12) conceives a regional “great” power as: 
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 a state which is geographically a part of the delineated region; 
 a state which is able to stand up against any coalition of other states in the 
region; 
 a state which is highly influential in regional affairs; 
 a state which, contrary to a “middle power”, might also be a great power 
on a world scale in addition to its regional standing. 
Osterud’s (1992) view of what constitutes a regional power is centred on the 
following: geographical location; military strength; influence in regional affairs; 
possible influence on a world scale. He is not explicit however on the means via 
which a state can attain the status of regional power, as well as the resources 
required to achieve such aspirations.  
A rather exhaustive list of what regional power entails is presented by Nolte (2010, 
p. 893) thus: 
 which articulates the pretension (self-conception) of a leading position in a 
region that is geographically, economically and political-ideationally 
delimited; 
 which displays the material (military, economic, demographic), 
organisational (political) and ideological resources for regional power 
projection; 
 which truly has great influence in regional affairs (activities and results); 
 which is economically, politically and culturally interconnected with the 
region; 
 which influences in a significant way the geopolitical delimitation and the 
political-ideational construction of the region; 
 which exerts this influence by means of regional governance structures; 
 which defines and articulates a common regional identity or project; 
 which provides a collective good for the region or participates in a 
significant way in the provision of such a collective good; 
 which defines the regional security agenda in a significant way; 
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 whose leading position in the region is recognised or at least respected by 
other states inside and outside of the region, especially by other regional 
powers; and 
 which is integrated in interregional and global forums and institutions 
where it articulates not only its own interests but acts as well, at least in a 
rudimentary way, as a representative of regional interests. 
Nolte’s (2010) characterisation of regional power can be summarised into the 
following: For a country to be accepted as a regional power, the country must first 
assume a leadership position in the region; possess tangible resources to project 
regional power; exhibit influence in regional affairs; display interconnectedness 
with other countries in the region; define and engage clearly attainable regional 
projects; provide collective good for the region; pursue a regional security agenda; 
receive regional acceptance of its leadership; and be at the forefront of global 
forum and institutions that would enable the country advance regional interests. 
These characteristics highlight that regional powers must be able to engage 
multilateral means to establish power and influence within the region while 
maximising the use of key resources that may be economic, political or cultural. 
Flemes (2007, p. 11) simply states that there are four crucial criteria that must exist 
in identifying and classifying regional power in international relations. He avers 
that potential regional powers will be compared via: 
 formulation of the claim to leadership; 
 possession of the necessary power resources; 
 employment of foreign policy instruments, and; 
 acceptance of the leadership role by third states. 
In other words, regional power can only exist when it has indicated its claim to 
leadership and identified its sphere of influence; possess the necessary power 
resources which may come in form of hard and soft power (Hard power is a 
concept employed to describe the use of military and economic resources to 
influence the behaviour or interests of actors, while soft power refers to influence 
drawn from a state’s culture, history and diplomacy (Nye, 1990); employs adequate 
and specific foreign policy instruments; and gain the acceptance of its leadership 
role by other states within and outside the region. 
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If a checklist were to be developed to identify whether or not Nigeria and South 
Africa qualify as regional powers based on the foregoing criteria presented by these 
scholars, they would fall short in one or more criteria (such as the active 
engagement of regional development projects and provision of collective good). 
This is why Ogunnubi and Uzodike in (Ogunnubi & Amao, 2016, p. 307) posit that 
regional (hegemonic) power refers to “a state that enjoys superior power 
advantages, possesses political and economic capabilities, boasts of a combined 
capacity for considerable influence on its neighbours, and enjoys a considerable 
level of acceptance of its regional leadership.” From this conception of regional 
power, Nigeria and South Africa can be categorised as regional powers as they 
both possess political and economic capabilities that have enhanced their influence 
within the region. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework and Application of Theory 
Several theories in International Relations have attempted to improve the 
understanding of power relations. The dominant approach in the field however, has 
been the Realist approach. (Baylis & Smith, 2005) The realists posit that the basis 
of international relations is the power struggle among nations which tries to 
maximise their interests. Major proponents of the realist theory include: 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hans Morgenthau, Thomas Hobbes, E.H. Carr, Kenneth 
Waltz. (Yilmaz, 2010) 
The realist theory presents some assumptions. First, states are the main actors of 
global politics. Secondly, realists affirm that states’ behaviour is influenced by the 
external environment and internal characteristics of actors, implying that culture or 
ideologies do not make any difference. The external environment is the anarchic 
system of the world. Thirdly, states seek for survival, thus the struggle for power is 
inevitable, and a zero-sum game is central to the theory. States will go into 
conflicts or even wars to maximize their power at the expense of others. Lastly, 
states are assumed to be rational actors. (Dirzauskaite & Ilinca, 2017) 
Applying the theory to a discourse on hegemony imports that a hegemon would 
meet the following criteria as postulated in Dirzauskaite & Ilinca (2017): A 
hegemon must have substantial relative power in comparison to other actors within 
the given scope. Secondly, a hegemon should be willing and able to engage rules or 
foreign policy within international politics. Put differently, a hegemon should have 
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the capacity to exhibit international leadership role, and its leadership must be 
recognized and accepted by other major powers.  
It can be inferred from the above elucidation that realism emphasize the possession 
of economic and military power to achieve dominance. However, it is crucial to 
also include the role of culture and ideology in the achievement of hegemonic 
status. It is in this regard that Konrad (2012) affirms that, while realism projects 
dominance of one state over another, Gramscian theory defines hegemony as a 
combination of coercion and consent which is not merely exercised by the state, 
but by civil society as well. The inclusion of the Gramscian theory, as postulated 
by Antonio Gramsci in the 20
th
 century (Fontana, 1993) does not negate the tenets 
of the realist theory, but provides a blend that enables the inclusion of other factors 
such as culture, ideology and consent, crucial to attaining hegemonic status in 
contemporary international system. Interestingly, Nye (2002) posits that the 
universal nature of a country’s culture tied with its ability to establish a set of rules 
and institutions that govern areas of international activity are core sources of power 
which are instrumental to any state that wields it. The combination of these theories 
is what informs Joseph’s (2002, p. 1) averment on hegemony thus:  
...the construction of consent and the exercise of leadership by the dominant group 
over subordinate groups; in its more complex form, this deals with issues such as 
the elaboration of political projects, the articulation of interests, the construction of 
social alliances, the development of historical blocs, the deployment of state 
strategies and the initiating of passive revolutions.  
The application of realism to a study on hegemony finds expression in the fact that 
a regional hegemon should be able to display characteristics of a global hegemon 
within the region while taking into consideration the tenets of hegemony as 
underscored by the Gramscian school of thought. Nigeria’s foreign policy, since 
independence in 1960, was specifically designed to be an instrument of national 
development and to facilitate leadership in African affairs. It is to this extent that 
Nigerian political class, elite and scholars have longed for Nigeria to be Africa’s 
leader, one to be reckoned with even within the context of  global affairs 
(Akinterinwa, 2012). This drive has influenced the nature of Nigeria’s actions 
within the region towards the goal of attaining hegemonic status. Some of these 
actions include: the key role Nigeria played in the formation of Organization for 
African Unity (OAU) in 1963 (now African Union (AU)) as a strategy to advance 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                  Vol. 10, no. 2/2017 
   132 
its national and African interests; Nigeria’s strategic use of the Commonwealth as a 
platform to underscore African position on institutionalised racism; the use of 
political and economic levers to tinker with the Western powers thought and action 
on issues affecting African interests; the steady support in material and human 
forms for the liberation forces in the fight against apartheid rule in South Africa; 
Nigeria being the driving force of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and Nigeria’s peacekeeping efforts within and beyond the 
African region to mention but a few. (Meierding, 2010, pp. 12-15) 
The aforementioned strategic actions taken by the Nigerian government over the 
years tally with the realist conception of what defines a hegemon. Clearly, Nigeria 
has made attempts at depicting substantive power that has been acknowledged 
within the region. In terms of being able to engage rules and policy within the 
international arena, Nigeria continues to project African interests, even when in 
contrast to the opinions of Western powers. This could be seen in the 
encouragement of other African leaders to boycott the Montreal Olympic games in 
order to protest New Zealand’s interactions with apartheid South Africa in 1976 
(Bukarambe, 2000, p. 116). These examples characterise leadership within the 
region as provided by the Nigerian government. However, scholars like Oni and 
Taiwo (2016) argue that Nigeria’s approach to hegemonic status has been flawed 
due to its seeming altruistic nature. Premised on the above, this paper seeks to 
evaluate Nigerian foreign policy as a tool for attaining regional hegemony status on 
the African continent. The contentions that exist between Nigeria and South Africa 
is reinforced by the desire to extend their power capabilities beyond the West 
African and Southern African sub-region respectively, with the goal of emerging as 
Africa’s sole leader. The next section analyses Nigeria and South Africa’s foreign 
policy in relation to their regional hegemonic aspirations. 
 
4. Overview of Nigeria’s and South Africa’s Foreign Policies 
As stated earlier, Nigeria’s foreign policy has been largely Afrocentric since 1960 
with a few modifications towards economic and citizen diplomacy in 1986 and 
2010 respectively (Meierding, 2010). These additions however, were still operated 
within the context of the Afrocentric base of Nigeria’s foreign policy. The 
Afrocentric foreign policy thrust and the successful execution of its objectives have 
put Nigeria at the forefront of the region’s advancements. (Ujara & Ibietan, 2014) 
The core principles and objectives of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence 
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have centred on: African unity and independence; capability to exercise hegemonic 
influence in the region; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-alignment and non- 
interference in the internal affairs of the nation-states; equality of all states; 
multilateral diplomacy; and regional economic cooperation and development. 
(Akinterinwa, 2012; Ukwuije, 2015) As a result of the foreign policy goal of the 
Nigerian government, material and human resources were expended to advance 
Nigeria’s policy at the regional level. These found expression in the financial 
resources and human capital that Nigeria has contributed to ensure peacekeeping 
and development via bilateral and multilateral means in the region. 
After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, there were expectations that Nigeria would 
play pivotal roles in the revival of Africa, but these expectations began to diminish 
even before South Africa re-entered the comity of nations as a democracy in 1994. 
Nigeria’s role in the liberation of Africa from colonialism, the special support she 
gave to the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and the continued support 
given to African countries in times of crisis or need are memorable and worthy of 
mention. Nigeria’s diminishing influence is traceable to factors such as: economic 
decline, the administrative lapses of some military regimes in the country 
(Umezurike & Asuelime, 2015), as well as poorly managed civilian 
administrations. 
South Africa’s foreign policy priorities since its first universal elections in 1994 
emphasise the protection of human rights, democracy, fight against poverty and 
reconciliation in post-conflict areas in Africa. (Tétényi, 2014) During the apartheid 
regime in South Africa, the foreign policy of the country was centred on 
isolationist diplomacy. But, with its freedom from the apartheid, South Africa 
sought a prominent leadership role in Africa. Thus, the foreign policy is targeted at 
seeking identification and engagement with the rest of Africa. South Africa’s quest 
for regional leadership is embedded in the “Mbeki Doctrine” which aims at 
“African Renaissance” and has found expression via South Africa’s involvement in 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development. (Flemes, 2007, p. 19) The nature 
and stance of South Africa’s foreign policy is traceable to the history of the South 
African people during apartheid and white minority rule, which underscores her 
policy direction in a bid to prevent a repeat of the past narratives. 
Both Nigeria and South Africa have encouraged commitment to African 
development programmes commissioned by the developed countries, and attempts 
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to ensure that engagement with developed countries meets Africa's objective of 
weaning the continent from underdevelopment. They have also worked closely on 
conflict prevention and resolution, the establishment and effectiveness of the 
African Union, and proposed a detailed blueprint for sustainable development of 
Africa. (Tétényi, 2014)The Nigeria-South Africa relations have been a “potpourri 
of co-operation and conflict”, as both states are immersed in rivalry on leadership 
issues, which created setbacks of sorts since the Obasanjo and Mbeki 
administrations. (Seteolu & Okuneye, 2017, p. 65) Both states continue to make 
attempts at extending their hegemony beyond their respective sub-region to emerge 
as Africa’s foremost state. These attempts are not pursued in isolation; they are tied 
to the guiding principles of the national interest and have effect on Nigeria-South 
Africa bilateral relations. (Odubajo & Akinboye, 2017) These are visible both in 
cooperation and hostilities between both states. Several trade and investment 
exchanges have been made between the two countries as can be seen in the 
telecommunications, retail, media, banking, construction, engineering, oil and gas, 
service and hospitality sectors. (Ebegbulem, 2013) Both countries have also 
experienced diplomatic feud on several occasions as expressed in the “deportation” 
diplomatic row of 2012, arms deal negotiations debacle of 2014, and the frequent 
xenophobic clashes (Egwemi & Ochim, 2016) to mention but a few. 
 
5. The Nigeria-South Africa Arms Deal Debacle and Implications for 
Hegemony Status in Africa: An Exposition 
This section highlights the 2014 Arms Deal debacle that resulted in a diplomatic 
brawl between Nigeria and South Africa. This is essentially so, because it is 
perceived to represent a diplomatic blow on Nigeria by the South African 
government. It is arguable that this action taken by the South African government 
resonates negatively for Nigeria in the quest for hegemony within the region. In a 
bid to curb the spread of terrorism in Nigeria, the Nigerian government sought to 
purchase arms from South Africa to strengthen the fight against insurgency in the 
country. Akinola (2017) affirms that USA and her allies refused to sell arms to 
Nigeria based on concerns over human rights infringements by the Nigerian 
military on civilians in the course of prosecuting the war on terror in Nigeria.  
In September 2014, Nigeria’s attempt to buy arms from South Africa became a 
serious controversy when South African government officials intercepted and 
seized cash worth 9.3 million US dollars (Ibekwe, 2014; Ugwuanyi, 2016) found 
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
135 
 
aboard a private aircraft that Nigeria hired to purchase arms from South Africa. 
The plane consisted of one Israeli and two Nigerian arms agents working on behalf 
of the Nigerian government. South African government officials seized the money 
under claims that there were irregularities in the manner in which the arms deal 
was being executed. The seizure and subsequent actions was embarrassing to the 
Nigerian government, especially since she claimed categorically that the South 
African government was fully aware of Nigeria’s intentions to purchase arms from 
her. (Akinola, 2017, p. 130) This is one out of many awkward situations that 
Nigeria found herself with South Africa in recent times.  
In analysing the political expediency for Nigeria to negotiate arms purchase with 
South Africa in view of the competition for superiority between both countries, one 
must bring to bear the fact that Nigeria attempted to make legitimate orders from 
other countries of the world such as America, Israel, UK and a few others, but the 
USA allegedly stood on the way of such negotiations based on their earlier 
mentioned human rights concerns. (Ibekwe, 2014) Nigeria was forced to engage in 
back-door negotiations with South Africa that ultimately went sour with the seizure 
fracas that attended the process. A discourse on the arms deal between Nigeria and 
South Africa would be irrelevant if Nigeria had embarked on her own weapons 
development programme through Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria 
(DICON) that would have enabled her to be self-sufficient to some extent, 
especially since Nigeria possesses the human and material resources to embark on 
such quests.  
In view of the security challenge facing the country at that time, it was necessary to 
seek assistance in combating issues of terrorism. Both the conduct of Nigeria and 
South Africa in the arms deal arrangement could have been handled better. Despite 
the intent to carry out a covert arms purchase, it should have been executed in line 
with South African regulations, and resolving such issues ought to take cognizance 
of enlightened diplomatic means and in the true spirit of African brotherliness. The 
diplomatic altercation that ensued led Nigeria to threatening South African 
companies should the purchase be stalemated. (Ipsos, 2014) Both countries 
eventually resolved to follow procedure and agreement on future arms negotiations 
and purchases to avoid a repeat of the ugly experience. (Ugwuanyi, 2016) 
In 2013, the contest became more evident when Nigeria ignored South Africa’s 
invitation to join the BRICS summit in South Africa. (Musawa, 2013) The year 
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2012 was memorable in view of the events that surround the quest for Africa’s 
hegemonic power. There were contentions over the recognition of the government 
led by Manuel Nhamadjo in Guinea-Bissau at the AU (African Union) summit in 
January of that year with South Africa in opposition and Nigeria in support. 
(Musawa, 2013) By September 2012, Nigeria and South Africa were entangled in a 
diplomatic feud that involved the deportation of 125 Nigerians over allegations that 
they were in possession of fake yellow fever vaccination cards. The Nigerian 
government reciprocated by deporting 84 South Africans within two days (Oni & 
Taiwo, 2016, p. 68), and this ended with an apology from the South African 
government. In the same year, South Africa triumphed in the battle for the seat of 
AU Commission chairperson producing Dlamini Zuma as the first woman to lead 
the region on the AU platform.  
In the competition for superiority between both countries, South Africa has been a 
step or more ahead of Nigeria, not by mere happenstance, but by consciously 
articulated foreign policy objectives and actions, visible in her active participation 
in regional and global governance (through institutions like SADC, BRICS, UNSC, 
AU) that position her at the forefront of affairs on the African continent in recent 
times. (Tétényi, 2014) This has been evident in the fact that South Africa is the 
only African representative on the membership of strategic multilateral 
organizations such as BRICS, IBSA and the G20. According to Nolte (2010), 
investment bankers at the beginning of the twenty-first century projected that the 
BRIC (before the inclusion of South Africa) represents the future emerging 
economic powers. Their projection was that by the fourth decade of the twenty-first 
century, China would have overtaken the US economy as the largest globally, and 
by the second half of the century, India may follow suit. Membership of such a 
grouping as the BRICS would have afforded Nigeria a good platform to transcend 
the regional scale, and operate on a global scale. Unfortunately, it is discernible 
from studies and projections that South Africa emerged over Nigeria to join the 
group. 
Nigeria trails behind South Africa in recent times in a bid to catch up with her 
advancement in regional and global politics. While Nigeria may have obtained its 
ebbing title as “Giant of Africa” due to its activities in Africa during the 
decolonization process of Africa, factors that have partially aided the maintenance 
of the title till date is Nigeria’s possession of hard (military) power; rising 
population which has greatly influenced the country’s status as one of the largest 
economies in Africa; and the great influence that Nigeria has within the West 
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African sub-region. This explains why Osaghae (1998) referred to Nigeria as a 
“Crippled Giant”, while Oni and Taiwo (2016) remarked that the “Giant of Africa” 
title was self-bestowed. Nigeria needs to get over the “Big Brother” approach to 
foreign policy and realise that is not a sustainable path in seeking the desired 
relevance. Osuntokun (1987) avers that until the national and economic questions 
are addressed first, Nigeria cannot play a dominant role in Africa.  
Challenges to Nigeria’s foreign policy revolve around domestic issues and the 
limited scope of the foreign policy thrust. The shortcomings include: leadership 
ineptitude, economic mismanagement, insecurity related to militant and terrorist 
attacks, corruption, financial fraud, electoral malpractices, infrastructural decay, 
ethnic/sectarian violence, resource control, and political instability. (Folarin, 2013) 
Nigeria’s foreign policy stance is still heavily Afrocentric with emphases on 
decolonization, dismantling of apartheid, and eradication of racial bigotry, issues 
that are no longer pressing in Africa today. (Okpokpo, 2000) While it was laudable 
till the 1990s, it needs a rethink to meet the needs of contemporary international 
affairs. Issues like globalization, human rights, democracy, terrorism, migration 
and environment, are not properly captured in Nigerian foreign policy. 
(Akinterinwa, 2016) 
 
6. Conclusion and Recommendations 
This study argues that while Nigeria and South Africa may not have attained full 
hegemonic status in the region, it does not dispute the assertion that they are sub-
regional powers in their own rights. What they have attained is likened to Warner’s 
(2016, p. 5) concept of “illusory hegemony” in which regional powers in the 
international system “...seemingly possess realist attributes of a regional hegemon 
but lack the liberal attributes…to cover up insufficiencies in the latter through 
rhetorical assertions of competence, prevarication about failures, and rejections of 
intrusion by outsiders that might undermine their reputation as regional leaders.” 
There is a need however for Nigeria to adopt a more policy-oriented approach to 
obtaining global relevance instead of its dependence on providing assistance and 
projecting the “Big Brother” approach as the route. Policies targeted at positioning 
Nigeria’s economy strategically ahead of South Africa’s; providing resources 
useful to the rest of the world (apart from oil) and projecting its international 
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relevance should be articulated and properly executed. Predicated on the axiom that 
one cannot give what he does not have, Nigeria cannot give stability to Africa 
when it cannot give same at home. 
It can be argued that, in the spirit of good neighbourliness, as espoused in Nigeria’s 
foreign policy, Nigeria would need to maintain friendly bilateral relations with not 
just South Africa, but other African countries. In the contest for superiority 
between both countries, Nigeria has to be more articulate, strategic and realistic in 
the approach it chooses to win this continuous competition as her rival - South 
Africa is doing. It is essential as well for scholars to abandon the idea of projecting 
the previous assistance that Nigeria rendered to South Africa, in view of the fact 
that realism in international relations projects power as the ultimate goal of foreign 
policy and state actions. Simply put, “the basis of international relations is the 
power struggle among nations which try to maximize their interests”. (Yilmaz, 
2010, p. 192) Though, South Africa may be required to reciprocate Nigeria’s 
efforts in the past on the fight against apartheid, but it would be unrealistic to 
expect that South Africa will ignore its national interests and quest for superiority 
in the region to gratify Nigeria’s ego and pursuit. South Africa is advancing faster 
than Nigeria in the quest for supremacy, largely because it engages the very 
important factor of national interest with clearly articulated foreign policy goals. 
Thus, even if South Africa has other internal challenges that can slow down her 
quest, it makes up for the weakness via strategic policies with clarity of purpose. 
Nigeria has what it takes to surpass South Africa in the quest for regional 
hegemony because the country has been active in the game of regional politics 
much longer than South Africa and possesses resources, human and material that 
outweighs South Africa’s. Even with the seemingly inconsistent methods that 
Nigeria adopts in projecting her foreign policy, South Africa and most countries in 
the region still see Nigeria as a force to reckon with. This implies that, with the 
right policy direction backed by an effective domestic environment, Nigeria can be 
Africa’s sole hegemon. Until Nigeria solves its domestic issues, such as leadership 
crisis, corruption, ethno-religious combustions and terrorism, to mention but a few, 
she might just continue trailing behind South Africa, and at the risk of other 
countries overtaking her in the race.  
The paper therefore recommends that Nigeria needs to re-strategise properly and 
build on its foreign policy thrusts to capture national interests. As Ola (2017, p. 54) 
puts it, “foreign policies are meant to drive the economy of a nation and not strain 
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it.” Nigeria’s foreign policy objectives should focus on ensuring the protection and 
welfare of Nigerians at home and abroad, which can be fully captured in enriched 
citizen and economic diplomacy thrusts. The foreign policy objectives should tally 
with Nigeria’s actions internally and externally, and also be restructured to 
properly articulate national interest. A realist approach that interrogates every 
proposed move with the question: “what’s in it for us?” should be adopted. Nigeria 
already has the platform; it just needs to make proactive moves in the right 
direction. 
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